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CURRENT TAX ISSUES
AFFECTING RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
HOWARD M. SCHOENFELD, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Treasury Department recently proposed changes to
the Internal Revenue Code that, if enacted, would affect tax ex-
empt organizations. This piece focuses on two tax issues related
to the proposed changes which may have a significant impact on
religious organizations, and is based upon a discussion of issues
before the Diocesan Attorneys Association in May, 1994. The is-
sues are still current, however, at the time of publication, the
proposals are intermediate.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the tax issues and their under-
lying reasoning, some history is helpful. Two matters are central
to an understanding of current events. One is from The Bible,
and the other is from a relatively recent Supreme Court case.
Director, Exempt Organizations, Price Waterhouse, LLP. Mr. Schoenfeld re-
ceived his B.A. in Accounting in 1962 and his LL.B. in 1966, both from the Univer-
sity of Baltimore. Prior to joining Price Waterhouse, Mr. Schoenfeld served at the
Internal Revenue Service in Washington, D.C. He is the recipient of four Senior Ex-
ecutive Service Special Act Awards and the Commissioner's Award, and has been a
participant in many tax programs and guest lecturer at various universities, includ-
ing Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, and Harvard.
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A. A Biblical Perspective
The first example is derived from the Joseph story in the
book of Genesis.1 The Pharaoh of Egypt had two dreams which
troubled him.2 In his first dream, the Pharaoh stood by the Nile
while seven fat, sleek calves came up out of the river.! Subse-
quently, seven thin, bony calves emerged from the river and con-
sumed the seven fat calves.' In his second dream, seven thin,
withered heads of grain swallowed seven full, ripe heads of
grain.5 These dreams worried the Pharaoh, so he consulted all
the wise men and magicians in Egypt but no one could explain
them to him.6
Then the Pharaoh's cup bearer told the Pharaoh that Joseph
had correctly interpreted the cup bearer's dream while he was in
prison.7 The Pharaoh sent for Joseph and asked him the mean-
ing of his two dreams.8 Joseph said that the meaning of the
dreams was one and the same: there will be seven years of
plenty followed by seven years of famine.9 Joseph told the Phar-
aoh he should appoint officials to impose a flat tax of twenty per-
cent on the produce of the land during the years of plenty to
serve as a reserve for the years of famine."0
Joseph so impressed the Pharaoh that he appointed him the
governor over all Egypt." Just as Joseph had predicted, seven
1 Genesis 37:2-50:26. Jacob's favorite wife Rachel was Joseph's mother. Genesis
29:30, 30:23-24. Joseph's brothers, out of jealousy, sold him as a slave to Midianite
traders. Genesis 37:28. The traders, in turn, sold Joseph to Potiphar, the Captain of
the Pharaoh's guard. Genesis 37:36. Potiphar's wife, who was angry because Joseph
refused her advances, claimed Joseph attempted to rape her. Genesis 39:11-18.
Potiphar arrested Joseph and imprisoned him because he had insulted his wife.
Genesis 39:19-20.
2 Genesis 41:1-7.
3 Genesis 41:1-2.
4 Genesis 41:3-4.
Genesis 41:5-7.
Genesis 41:8.
Genesis 41:9-13. The Pharaoh was angry with his cup bearer and imprisoned
him. Genesis 40:1-3. The cup bearer had a curious dream while in prison and told
his dream to Joseph. Genesis 40:5-11. Joseph correctly interpreted that, in three
days, the Pharaoh would pardon the cup bearer, release him and restore him to his
position. Genesis 40:12-13, 20-22.
8 Genesis 41:14-15.
9 Genesis 41:25-32.
'0 Genesis 41:34-36.
" Genesis 41:38-43.
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years of famine began after seven years of plenty." After the
second year *of famine, the conditions were so severe that the
people sold their land to the Pharaoh." Joseph then gave them
seed to sow the land." In exchange for the seed, the people gave
one fifth, or twenty percent, of the harvest to the Pharaoh,
keeping the remaining crop for themselves and their children. 5
Realizing that Joseph's scheme would save their lives, the people
agreed to pay the twenty percent tax. 6 Joseph made the collec-
tion of twenty percent of the harvest "a statute concerning the
land of Egypt; ... [only] the land of the priests alone did not be-
come Pharoah's,"7 because the Pharaoh did not buy the land
owned by the priests. 8 Consequently, the priests' land was ex-
empt from the twenty percent tax.9 This exemption is a likely
forerunner of our modern day exemption from tax on land or in-
come used for exclusively religious purposes."
Several questions come to mind concerning the enforcement
of Joseph's twenty percent tax. How did Joseph know when the
people paid their taxes? Did he determine a time limit? Were
there accompanying forms to complete? Did Joseph appoint a
Commissioner of Internal Revenue? What happened if the land
owned by the priests was leased to non-priests? As these ques-
tions clearly display, the necessary relationship between
schemes of taxation and accompanying exemptions from tax is
literally ancient history.2'
B. The Supreme Court View
The second historical matter concerns a modern day consti-
'2 Genesis 41:53-54.
13 Genesis 47:18-20.
'4 Genesis 47:23.
" Genesis 47:24.
" Genesis 47:25.
'7 Genesis 47:26.
18 Genesis 47:22,26. The priests did not have to sell their lands because the
Pharaoh gave them an allowance of food on which to live. Genesis 47:22.
'9 See Genesis 47:26.
20 I.R.C. § 501 (West 1995) (stating that organizations operated exclusively for
religious purposes are exempt from taxation).
Cf THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 41 (Raymond E. Brown et al.
eds., 1990). Although little is known about the economic history of Egypt, an ex-
emption enjoyed by priests from the income tax is quite plausible. Id. However, Bi-
ble critics do not generally consider Scripture actual history, but rather as
"traditions" which incorporate historical points into theology. See id. at 3-4.
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tutional question faced by the Supreme Court in 1983. In Regan
v. Taxation With Representation of Washington," the Supreme
Court dealt with the constitutionality of the "substantial part"
test which limits lobbying activities by certain types of non-profit
organizations.23 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which identifies the substantial part test, grants tax exemptions
to certain non-profit organizations which do not substantially
engage in activities consisting of the dissemination of propa-
ganda or other attempts to influence legislation. "4 In addition,
section 501(c)(3) organizations are eligible to receive deductible
contributions under section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.25 In its suit, Taxation With Representation of Washington
("TWR") made a frontal assault on the constitutionality of the
substantial part test.
26
22 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
23 id.
24 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1995). The relevant portion of the statute prohibits a
substantial part of the activities of the organization from including the carrying on
of propaganda and attempting to influence legislation. This lobbying restriction is
distinct from the absolute prohibition on political or electioneering activity, which is
defined as particip:.ting or intervening in (including the publishing or distribution of
statements) any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for
public office. Id.
Additionally, section 501 (c)(4) of the Code grants tax exempt status to certain
social welfare organizations. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(4) (West 1995). Civic organizations or-
ganized exclusively for social welfare and local associations of employees which are
devoted exclusively to charitable, educational or recreational purposes are exempt
from taxation. Id. 501 (c)(4) organizations, unlike 501 (c)(3) organizations, have no
limit on the amount of lobbying they may undertake. See id; cf. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3)
(West 1995). However, 501 (c)(4) organizations cannot receive tax deductible contri-
butions from their donors. See I.R.C. § 170 (c)(2) (West 1995) (stating that organiza-
tion disqualified under § 501 (c)(3) may not receive tax deductible contributions).
215 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (West 1995). This section specifically limits the receipt of
deductible contributions to organizations which are not disqualified for tax exemp-
tion under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation or for
participation in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id.
26 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
TWR is a nonprofit organization which was formed to take over the operation of two
other nonprofit organizations, one of which had tax-exempt status under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) and the other under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Id. at 540. The Internal Revenue
Service denied TWR's application for tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3) because it
appeared that a substantial part of TWR's activities consisted of attempting to in-
fluence legislation, which is violative of § 501(c)(3). Id. at 542. TWR then brought
suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualified for the tax ex-
emption provided by § 501(c)(3). Id.
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The organization raised two challenges.27  First, TWR
claimed that there was a violation of its First Amendment rights
to free speech.2" TWR, desiring to lobby without limitation but
restricted by the substantial part test, claimed this restriction
constituted a violation of Free Speech under the First Amend-
ment.29 Second, TWR argued that there was a violation of the
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause."° TWR pointed out that section 501(c)(19) veterans
organizations can receive deductible contributions without lobby-
ing limitations.31 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the
taxpayer.2 However, after asserting probable jurisdiction," the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Internal Revenue Service
and held that the substantial part test is constitutional.34 The
importance of this case rests in the Supreme Court's rationale.
The Court pointed out that one must understand how tax laws
are written and how Congress might write future tax laws. The
Supreme Court, in order to evaluate TWR's claims, analyzed the
tax exemption scheme enacted by Congress. 5 The Supreme
Court said:
27 Id. at 542. TWR claimed that the prohibition against substantial lobbying
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id.
28 Id. at 545. TWR based its First Amendment argument on Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 860 (1958). Id. The Supreme Court held in
Speiser that it was unconstitutional, under the First Amendment, to deny a prop-
erty tax exemption to a person who refused to sign a declaration against advocating
the overthrow of the U.S. government. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518.
29 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. But see Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498 (1959)
(stating that governmPt need not allow lobbying expenses to be tax deductible un-
der allowance for ordinary business expense and, in effect, government need not
subsidize lobbying).
20 Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
"' Id. at 546-47. Section 501(c)(19) defines veteran's organizations as those or-
ganized within the U.S. or its possessions, having a membership that is at least 75
percent past or present members of the U.S. Armed Forces and a substantial por-
tion of the remaining membership having some connection to the U.S. Armed
Forces, and with no part of its earnings which inures to the benefit of any private
individual. I.R.C. § 501(c)(19) (West 1995).
12 Taxation With Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 741-42
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (accepting TWR's Due Process claim).
However, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the First Amendment claim. Id. at 726.
3 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 459 U.S. 819 (1982).
34 Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (finding no violation of First Amendment); id. at 549
(rejecting Fifth Amendment Due Process claim).
3 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
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Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy
that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption
has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of
the amount of tax it would otherwise have to pay on its income.
Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the
amount of a portion of the individual's contributions. The sys-
tem Congress has enacted provides this kind of subsidy to non-
profit civic welfare organizations generally, and an additional
subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not engage in
substantial lobbying. In short, Congress chose not to subsidize
lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities
that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public
welfare.
The Supreme Court, in effect, said that as long as Congress
had a rational tax classification scheme, one that was related to
a legitimate governmental purpose, it was constitutional under
both the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection component
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 7 Essentially, tax-
exempt status and deductibility of contributions are a matter of
legislative grace. 8 They are a privilege and not a right.
III. CURRENT TREASURY PROPOSALS AND NEW REQUIREMENTS
AFFECTING CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
The TWR discussion provides the background for several
matters of utmost importance to tax-exempt organizations, par-
ticularly religious organizations. On March 16, 1994, the Assis-
3' Id. (footnote omitted). Commentators view the tax exemption as an implicit
subsidy to the organization equal to the amount of taxes unpaid due to the exemp-
tion. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries
of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 857
(1993); Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578,
1620 (1992). The courts have also recognized the subsidy theory. See, e.g., Rosen-
berger v. University of Virginia, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4461, *74 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating exemptions from tax act as subsidies); Davis v. Michigan Department of the
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 824 (1989) (explaining state employees receive subsidy
through tax exemption). Despite the analogy, tax exemptions are not an exact
equivalent of a cash subsidy. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76
(1970).
37 Regan, 461 U.S. at 547. Due to the legislature's broad discretion in the field
of taxation one needs to show a "hostile and oppressive" discrimination within the
regulation while negating any "conceivable basis" proposed to support the regula-
tion. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940).
"' Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 (citing Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28
(1958)).
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tant Secretary for Tax Policy went before Congress to introduce
several Treasury proposals39 that will significantly affect relig-
ious organizations on a variety of levels.' ° These proposals make
sense in light of current statistics. According to recent I.R.S. re-
cords, there are 1.1 million tax-exempt organizations, not includ-
ing possibly several hundred thousand churches and small
organizations." There are about 489,000 public charities that
file returns.4'2 These returns indicate that the revenues of public
charities total $406 billion, their assets total $674 billion and
their charitable contributions total $80 billion.4'3  Furthermore,
the activities of these organizations represent seven percent of
the domestic gross product." Obviously, a member of Congress,
studying tax subsidies and tax expenditures, would have reason
to scrutinize the tax subsidy on the $80 billion of tax-exempt
'9 See 140 CONG. REC. D 260, 266-67 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1994) (recognizing sub-
committee hearing); Prepared Statement, infra note 40, at 51 (presenting text of
statement made by Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy).
4o The Treasury proposals were meant to allow the IRS to impose milder sanc-
tions than simply revocation of tax-exempt status for any violations. See Irwin M.
Birbaum & Jacob I. Friedman, Proposals Allow IRS to Impose Milder Penalties;
Sanctions on Tax-Exempt Institutions, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 8, 1994, at 5. Specifically, the
proposals seek to improve compliance by tax-exempt organizations through: a tax on
"excessive benefits" to organization insiders; penalties for failing to meet Form 990
requirements; requiring organizations to make copies of their Form 990 available
upon request; requiring additional information to be provided on Form 990; and re-
quiring organizations to disclose their donors the tax-deductibility of any contribu-
tions. Prepared Statement by Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Treasury Secretary for
Tax Policy, Before House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Hearing on Tax
Compliance by Charitable Organizations March 16, 1994 (Text), BNA DAILY TEX
REP., Mar. 17, 1994, § L, at 51 [hereinafter Prepared Statement]. The House Ways
and Means Committee agreed with the recommendations in the proposal. House
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Letter and Report to Full Committee on
Reforms to Improve the Tax Rules Governing Public Charities. Issued March 9, 1994
(Text)., BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, May 10, 1994. § L, at 88.
41 139 CONG. REC. H10622, 10623 (1993) (stating that in 1990 there were over
one million § 501(c) tax-exempt organizations and estimated 340,000 churches not
included in this figure).
Id. (estimating 489,000 tax-exempt organizations filed tax returns in 1990).
' Id.; IRS Looking into Tax Exemption Abuses, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
(Denver), June 20, 1995, at 38A (estimating non-profit organizations raise nearly
$700 billion annually).
4 139 CONG. REC. H10622, 10623 (1993) (recognizing charitable organizations
as contributing 7.4 percent of GDP, according to 1990 figures); IRS Looking into Tax
Exemption Abuses, supra note 43, at 38A (estimating contribution to GDP as about
10 percent).
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revenues generated by charitable contributions.45
Congress' concern in this area arose for a number of reasons
and was primarily the result of abuses by a few tax-exempt or-
ganizations.46 These abuses in turn spurred Congressional inter-
est in finding an appropriate remedy since most charitable
organizations do perform very important philanthropic activi-
ties47 and play a vital part in the pluralistic system of the United
States.48 Thus, the Treasury proposals and the IRS complaints
do not focus on the general population of charitable and religious
41organizations, but rather on the few limited abuse cases.
Under current law, Congress discovered that all too often,
the Treasury's only recourse against abuse cases was to penalize
the organization by revoking its tax-exempt status. ° For exam-
ple, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was asked what hap-
pens when an abuse case arises during a Subcommittee on
Oversight hearing before Chairman Pickle from Texas.5 Chair-
41 See 139 CONG. REC. H10622, 10623 (1993) (equating statistics on charitable
organizations as "Big Business" which creates possibility of great abuses).
See Bill McAllister, Charities Scored on Hill for CEO Pay, Perks, WASH.
POST, June 16, 1993, § 1, at A4 (reporting abuses found by Representative Pickle's
investigation of tax-exempt organizations' tax returns).
" See id. at A4 (stating that while reporting to Congress, IRS officials repeat-
edly maintained that most charities performed important work); Prepared State-
ment, supra note 43, at 51 (affirming Treasury Department belief that most
charities do worthy work).
48 Testimony June 6, 1995 Michael J. Boskin, Professor of Economics and Sen-
ior Fellow, Tully M. Friedman, Hoover Institution, Stanford University House Ways
and Means Tax Code Revision, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TES-
TIMONY, June 6, 1995 (testifying that charities strengthen pluralistic democracy be-
cause charitable deductions yield more for charities than Treasury actually loses);
Barber Conable, Charity's "Special Interest", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10,
1985, at 102 (opining public policy has been on charities' side because they have
done so much to make United States pluralistic society).
4' Exempt Organizations Warned to Conform to Requirements, BNA PENSIONS
& BENEFITS DAILY, Mar. 6, 1995 (announcing IRS investigation into abuses by tax-
exempt organizations, especially colleges, universities and health care organiza-
tions).
*o See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
51 139 CONG. REC. H10622, 10623 (1993) (stating abuse by charities as area of
particular concern). The Commissioner gave several examples of such abuses in-
cluding: 1) the purchase of a 42-foot boat for an insider's personal use and leasing
property to an insider without charging rent; 2) a hospital sold to a for-profit corpo-
ration run by members of the hospital board for less than fair market value; 3) a
church paying for its founder's jewelry, clothing, and luxury cars; and 4) many or-
ganizations paying outrageous salaries and providing expensive vacations and
homes to their executives. Id. at H10624.
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man Pickle has a very deep and abiding interest in tax-exempt
organizations"2 and wants to make sure that taxpayers' dollars
are being spent as directed. 3
The Subcommittee was curious to know if current IRS pro-
cedures could deal effectively with problems in this area." The
Commissioner testified that the IRS has particularly severe
problems in administering the tax laws pertaining to public
charities when issues of private inurement and private benefit
arise."5
Under the current Internal Revenue Code, any inurement of
net earnings to private individuals can result in the loss of
501(c)(3) status.56 501(c)(3) organizations must exclusively serve
the public as opposed to private interests. 7 If an organization is
found to have allowed its net earnings to inure to a private indi-
vidual or to have served substantial private interests there is
only one sanction available to the IRS under the Internal Reve-
nue Code-revocation of tax-exempt status.58  The loss of tax-
exempt status means that the organization can no longer receive
51 Pickle took a "vow" to do something about tax-exempt organization abuses.
Bruce D. Collins, So You Say You Want a Revolution? It's Coming, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 1993, at 6.
Congressman Pickle expressed concern that contributions were being used to
benefit certain insiders within the charities rather than benefitting the charities
themselves. Pickle, Richardson Say More Tools Needed to Enforce Exempt Status
Laws, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REPr., June 21, 1993.
'4 See 139 CONG. REC. H10622 (1993) (indicating that IRS needs tools to iden-
tify and sanction acts of private inurement because current IRS procedures may not
be effective).
5 Federal Tax Laws Applicable to the Activities of Tax-Exempt Charitable Or-
ganizations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993)
[hereinafter June, 1993 Hearings] (testimony of Margaret Milner Richardson,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stating "both the inurement and the private
benefit rules present difficulties for effective tax administration").
6 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995) ("[No part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ... "); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1995) (providing that organizations do not meet operational test
if their net earnings "inure in whole or part to the benefit of private" individuals).
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1995). See, e.g., Church of Scientology of
California v. C.I.R., 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988)
(holding that organizations will lose their tax-exempt status even if small part of
their income is inured to private individuals).
'8 I.R.C. § 503(a) (West Supp. 1995). See also June, 1993 Hearings, supra note
55, at 11 ("Under current law, the sanction for violation of any provision is revoca-
tion of an organization's exemption.").
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deductible contributions.59 Furthermore, the loss of tax-exempt
status can affect much more than just the 501(c)(3) organization
itself. A recent example cited by the Commissioner illustrates
the far-reaching implications of losing tax-exempt status. 60
Assume that an examination by a revenue agent reveals that
a large university is providing its president with inappropriate
benefits. The university may be paying the president a salary
that appears to be excessive in comparison to salaries paid to
presidents of comparable universities. Also, the university may
have provided the president with a substantial interest-free loan
or it may have paid for costly and luxurious amenities in the
president's official residence. Each of these facts would raise
serious inurement questions. Revoking the university's exemp-
tion, however, may provide an inappropriate penalty.6 Revoca-
tion could adversely affect the entire university community,
including employees, students and area residents."2 For in-
stance, an employee of a section 501(c)(3) organization is eligible
for a 403(b) retirement benefit. 3 This is a special benefit avail-
able to employees of schools and other section 501(c)(3) organi-
zations.' However, if the 501(c)(3) organization loses its
exemption status, its employees could find themselves also losing
their 403(b) retirement plan without having committed any
wrong.65 Similarly, investors who hold tax-exempt bonds issued
by a section 501(c)(3) hospital or university which loses its tax-
exempt status, could find themselves with significant tax prob-
59 See generally I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (stating requirements of
organizations in order to receive deductible contributions); id. §§ 6113, 6710 (stating
requirements of charitable organizations to disclose non-deductibility of contribu-
tions and penalties for failure to disclose).
60 June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at 18-19 (prepared statement of Hon.
Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
a' June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55 at 18-19.
U.S. Department of the Treasury's Proposals to Improve Compliance by Tax-
Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1994)
[hereinafter March, 1994 Hearings] (testimony of Hon. Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury).
61 I.R.C. § 403(b) (West Supp. 1995). Amounts contributed to annuity plans are
purchased by the employees of § 501(c)(3) organizations are "excluded from the
gross income of the employee for the taxable year .... Id. § 403(b)(1)(E).
" See id. § 403(b).
6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.403(b)-l(e)(4) (1995) (status of employer implicates 403(b)
benefits of employee).
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lems because the interest on the bonds would no longer be ex-
cludable from their income."
In short, the Service is often faced with the difficult choice of
either revoking an organization's tax exemption, with all the in-
appropriate tax consequences that follow, or taking no enforce-
ment action so long as the compensation in question has been
recorded accurately on the individual taxpayer's return.67 This is
obviously not the most effective way to administer the tax laws.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in fact, pointed out that
problems such as this do not permit "fair and equitable"" tax
administration; they do not provide any certainty of conse-
quences for misconduct; and they certainly do not place penalties
on the wrongdoer.69
Between June 1993 and March 1994, the Treasury Depart-
ment developed proposals to introduce intermediate sanctions as
an alternative to the revocation of tax-exempt status." These
proposals were introduced on March 16, 1994."' The proposals
refer to problems in administering current law and look to the
private foundation rules as a useful framework to provide a
standard for tax-exempt organizations."
The 1969 private foundation rules enacted comprehensive,
tiered excise taxes dealing with specific spheres of conduct.73 If a
violation occurs, an excise tax is placed upon the wrongdoer in
6 See I.R.S. News Release, IR-90-60 (April 3, 1990) (warning against poten-
tially abusive transaction which may result in loss of tax-exempt status leading to
taxation on interest paid by bonds issued by 501(c)(3) organizations and hospitals).
67 June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at 19.
June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at 13.
'9 See June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at 11 (testimony of Commissioner
stating that "[u]nder current law, ... revocation of such an organization's exemption
does not adequately focus punishment on the abusers.").
70 See June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55; March, 1994 Hearings, supra note
62. The proposals apply to § 501(c)(4) organizations as well as § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions. March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 11. See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (West
Supp. 1993) (explaining what types of organizations are granted 501(c)(4) status);
see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) (explaining what types of organizations are
501(c)(3) organizations).
"' March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 1-26.
72 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62.
73 See I.R.C. § 4963 (West Supp. 1995) (providing definitions of first and second
tier excise taxes); see generally, id. § 4941(a)(1) (imposing excise tax on self-dealing
between disqualified persons and private foundations; id. § 4942(a) (imposing excise
tax on undistributed income); id. § 4944(a)(1) (imposing excise tax on investments
which jeopardize charitable purposes).
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the transaction.74 An opportunity for correction is provided, and75
if a correction is not made, a higher level tax may be imposed.7"
Furthermore, there are very severe penalties for willful, flagrant,
or repeated misconduct.77 While these private foundation rules
create a very complicated tax regime, the regime is an efficient
one since according to all the data available to the Internal
Revenue Service, private foundations are among the most com-
pliant category of taxpayers in the United States.8 The high
compliance rate among private foundations is not surprising
considering the very severe penalties that can befall the persons
responsible for malfeasance.79 The Treasury proposals thus in-
corporate the private foundation rules as a useful frame of refer-
ence.
so
As to the exact details of the proposed tax scheme, the
United States Department of the Treasury has taken the posi-
tion that problems with regard to private inurement and private
benefit generally can be dealt with as excess fair-market-value
transactions.8' This means that those in control of the organiza-
14 See id. § 4941(b)(1) (imposing 200% tax on disqualified person if self-dealing
is "not corrected within the taxable period"); id. § 4941(b)(2) (imposing a 50% tax on
foundation manager involved in self-dealing who refuses to be part of correction).
See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-l(a) (1995).
" See I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 1995). To "correct" is defined as "undoing the
transaction to the extent possible, but in any case placing the private position in a
financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person
were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards." Id. § 4941(e)(3). The Code also
provides, in certain cases, abatement of first and second tier taxes upon correction
of a taxable event. Id. §§ 4961, 4962. The period of correction is 90 days subject to
special rules. Id. § 4963(e)(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1(c)(1) (1995).
16 See supra note 74 (relevant Code and regulation sections pertaining to excise
taxes).
7 I.R.C. § 6684 (West Supp. 1995). An additional penalty equal to the amount
of the tax for persons who are liable for tax relating to private foundations is im-
posed if such persons are found "by reason of any act or failure to act which is not
due to reasonable cause and either" repeated or "willful and flagrant." Id.
78 Chih-Chin Ho, Form 990-T Compliance, in INTERNAL REVENUE RESEARCH
BULLETIN Pub. No. 1500, 47, 48 (1992). Cf June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at
72 (stating that study should be qualified because of "environment in which private
foundations operate").
79 See supra notes 74-76 (relevant Code and regulation sections for penalties
and additional taxes).
80 March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 12.
81 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 16-23 (discussing June 15, 1993
and August 2, 1993 hearings and explaining proposal to treat problems of private
inurement, among insiders of charitable organizations as excess fair market value
transactions).
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tion,s2 fiduciaries of the organization, cause it to enter into a
transaction not at fair market value, to the detriment of the or-
ganization and to the benefit of themselves.' The Treasury pro-
posal focuses on the excess taxable benefit, which means the
excess of the fair market value that is paid or received by an or-
ganization over the value of the goods or services provided.' Ex-
amples of payments made in excess of the fair market value of
services received which would be subject to this kind of tax in-
clude items that are not paid as reasonable compensation-
typically yachts, limos, maid service and interest-free loans (not
paid as compensation).85 Once it is determined that there is an
excess taxable benefit, a twenty-five percent tax would accrue
under the Treasury proposal." Unlike the revocation of tax-
exempt status, the penalty does not fall on the section 501(c)(3)
organization, but rather on its officers, directors, trustees or any
other person in a position to substantially influence its financial
affairs.87 It is intended that this penalty scheme will attract at-
tention to the person benefiting from such transactions thus
acting as a deterrent to other would-be offenders." Like the pri-
vate foundation rules, there is an opportunity for abatement if
there is a correction, 9 and there is a 200 percent tax if the excess
benefit is not corrected.9 °
Under the Treasury proposal, the sole sanction for an inap-
propriate benefit would be the imposition of the excise tax,9" the
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 20. Individuals in control of the
organization would include: "(i) the officers, directors, and trustees ... and (ii) those
otherwise in a position to exercise substantial influence over
the organization's affairs." Id.
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 20.
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 20. "[A] non-fair market value
transfer [is one] in which an insider pays inadequate consideration for property
transferred, leased, licensed or loaned by the organization, or the organization pays
excessive consideration for property transferred, leased, licensed, or loaned by the
insider." Id.
8 See June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55, at 11.
8 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 11-12.
" See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 11-12.
8 The purpose of the Treasury proposals is to deter insiders from using their
positions to receive unreasonable compensation and to involve the organization in
non-fair market value transfer resources. See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62,
at 26.
8 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 22.
o See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 22.
91 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 22. But see infra note 104 and
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intermediate sanction," so long as the organization is deter-
mined to be capable of having the fundamental character of a
charitable organization.93 This means that as long as the organi-
zation is doing what it is supposed to be doing-running a hospi-
tal, running a school or running a university-the sole sanction
that is available for an insider's misconduct would be the impo-
sition of an intermediate sanction upon the insiders of the or-
ganization.9
The following illustration provides an example of how the
Treasury intends the excise tax to apply. Assume that a section
501(c)(3) organization provides health care in a clinic setting.
The organization's board of directors is controlled by the CEO
and a small number of persons with whom the CEO of the or-
ganization itself have substantial business dealings. The total
compensation package of the CEO exceeded $1 million. The or-
ganization also made substantial credit card payments and cash
disbursements for personal expenditures, including liquor,
china, perfume, crystal, theater and airline tickets.
The CEO's compensation would be an excess benefit, subject
to excise tax, to the extent that it was determined to be unrea-
sonable. The unreasonableness of the CEO's compensation
would be assessed looking at all of the facts and circumstances,
including the nature of the CEO's duties and the compensation
paid by similar organizations to those who perform similar du-
ties. The means by which the organization determined the com-
pensation it paid the CEO would also be relevant. In this case,
although the organization's board presumably approved the
CEO's salary, the facts suggest that the board is not truly inde-
pendent. The CEO appears to have substantial influence over
the board. Therefore, even assuming that the board approved
the compensation, that fact would be given very little weight in
this particular case.95 The portion of the CEO's compensation
accompanying text (explaining caveat to excise tax as being sole sanction).
92 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that U.S. Department
of the Treasury proposed intermediate sanction as alternative to options of either
doinq nothing or revoking organization's tax-exempt status).
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 22 (stating that if excess benefit
is so egregious that organization can no longer be viewed as charitable, then organi-
zation would be subject to revocation of tax exemption in addition to imposition of
excise tax).
9 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 22.
"" March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 23.
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that is determined to be unreasonable would also be the portion
subject to tax.96
In addition to an excise tax, the Treasury proposals set forth
an exit tax that is analogous to the anti-abuse provision for pri-
vate foundations." This exit tax would prevent an organization
from dropping its status as a charitable organization simply to
escape imposition of the tax.98 Thus, if an organization wanted to
dissolve, reorganize or restructure, it would still be subject to an
exit tax.
In addition to the proposed excise and exit taxes discussed
above, the proposals also include certain increased disclosure re-
quirements.99 Since 1950, it has been a Congressional policy de-
cision that publicity through disclosure is a check against
potential abuses." For example, some organizations may file
Form 990101 returns. The Form 990 is a public disclosure vehicle
which is available to the general public, like an interested tax-
payer or even a newspaper reporter."° Currently, the penalty for
failing to file IRS Form 990 timely, accurately, or completely, is
$10 a day up to a maximum of $5,000 per year, regardless of the
size of the organization. 3 Consequently, if an organization does
not want to report the salary of its CEO or board members, or
report a certain transaction, it can always avoid doing so by
simply paying $5,000."°  This troubled the Internal Revenue
Service and Congress.05 In order to promote compliance, the
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 23.
97 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 23.
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 13.
See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 13.
'o See Senate Committee on Finance, Revenue Act of 1950, S. Rep. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 33 (1950), reprinted in 190 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3087, and in
116 United States Revenue Acts, 1909-1950, The Laws, Legislative Histories &
Administrative Documents, 164 (1950).
10 See I.R.C. § 6033 (West Supp. 1995); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(a)(2) (1995)
(requiring certain tax-exempt organizations to file returns on Form 990).
102 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62 at 13-14.
103 See I.R.C. § 6652(c) (West Supp. 1995).
'04 See supra text accompanying note 103 (explaining that maximum penalty
for not disclosing CEO's or board members salary is not to exceed lesser of $5,000 or
5 percent of gross receipts for year).
10" See generally June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55 at 53-72 (question and an-
swer session, between members of Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means and members of I.R.S., concerning non-compliance with
requirement of filing 990 tax form). Interestingly, a member of Congress actually
did his own survey with regard to compliance by tax-exempt organizations in the
36 CATHOLIC LAWYER, NO. 3
Treasury is proposing to increase the costs of non-compliance. 16
Under the Treasury proposal, the $10 daily penalty for failure to
file Form 990 becomes $100 and the $5,000 maximum penalty
becomes $50,000.'" It is submitted that the proposed penalties
should increase compliance, especially by those organizations
which treat the current penalties as ordinary operating costs.
The Treasury proposals also contain additional rules regard-
ing the solicitation of contributions."8 Historically, the public
has been confused by organizations that are simply nonprofit,
nonexempt organizations that solicit contributions under the
public's perception of tax deductibility."°9 Since contributions
made to nonprofit, nonexempt organizations are not deductible,"0
the proposals require that these organizations make a disclosure
to this extent."'
Another facet of the Treasury proposals is a provision re-
garding the availability of disclosures made on Form 990 to the
public."2 Under present law, if a member of the public wants to
review an organization's Form 990, it has to be made available
during regular business hours;"3 the charity is not obligated to
Washington area. He sent out a staff member to request Form 990, which he is en-
titled to do during regular business hours. See I.R.C. § 6104(e) (West Supp. 1995).
The results of the survey indicated that there was a very high degree of non-
compliance by those organizations.
06 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8. The proposed penalties of
$100 per day, up to a maximum $50,000 per tax return would be for organizations
with gross annual receipts exceeding $1 million. Organizations with gross receipts of
$1 million or less would be subject to penalties of $20 per day, with the maximum
penalty limited to the lesser of $10,000 or 5 per cent of the organization's gross an-
nual fees. Id.
"'7 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8.
108 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8.
19 Charitable deductions generally are allowed for (1) contributions to organi-
zations that are organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, re-
ligious, scientific, or certain other specified purposes, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2), (2)
contributions by individuals to certain fraternal organizations if such contributions
are to be used exclusively for charitable, etc. purposes, Id. § 170(c)(4)), and (3) con-
tributions to certain veterans organizations, Id. § 170(c)(3).
110 I.R.C. § 6613 (1988) requires tax-exempt organizations which are ineligible
to receive tax deductible contributions to disclose this fact to potential contributors.
However, nonprofit organizations which are not tax-exempt are not covered by §
6113, and thus under current law, when they solicit funds they are not required to
disclose that contributions are not tax deductible.
" See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8.
' See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 13-14.
. I.R.C. § 6104(e) (1988) requires exempt organizations, other than private
foundations, to make copies of their annual returns available for public inspection
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make or mail a copy of Form 990 and the form is only available
for public inspection."' However, the Treasury proposal provides
that the public may request copies for a reasonable fee.'15 Fur-
ther, the proposal acknowledges the possibility that some or-
ganizations will be subjected to harassment."6 An organization's
budget for mailing, handling and processing could deplete its re-
sources if it were flooded with requests for copies of Form 990.
Therefore, there is a provision that limits the number of requests
that an organization would be required to fill at any given
time.
117
Disclosure, along with substantiation, are factors taken into
consideration by various new requirements recently imposed on
charitable organizations."' As previously mentioned, disclosure
is regarded as a very powerful enforcement tool in the arsenal of
the Internal Revenue Service."9 New rules mandating substan-
during normal business hours.
... See I.R.S. Notice 88-120, 1988-48 I.R.B. 10. An organization is required to
have a copy of its annual returns and exemption record available for public inspec-
tion, but it is not required to photocopy or distribute these documents to the public.
Id. 15 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8. The proposal would require
an organization to publicize the availability of its Form 990 and to provide copies of
it upon request for a reasonable fee covering reproduction and mailing costs. Id.
Pursuant to this proposal, the Secretary of the Treasury would promulgate regula-
tions to establish procedures for public notification of the availability of Form 990,
as well as fix a price for securing such information. Id.
'16 March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8. In her testimony, Samuels rec-
ognized that requests for documents could be used to harass an organization and
suggested that organizations be required to respond only to a limited number of re-
quests in a given period. Id.
17 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8.
". See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (Supp. V 1993). This section provides that, "No deduc-
tion shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any contribution of $250 or more un-
less the taxpayer substantiates the written contribution by a contemporaneous
written acknowledgement of the contribution by the donee organization .... Id. at §
170 (f)(8)(A). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. T.D. 8544, 59 Fed. Reg. 27458 (1994)
(explaining § 170(f)(8) and soliciting public comment on whether transitional relief
is required for 1994 contributions); I.R.S. Notice 95-15, 1995-15 I.R.B. 22 (explaining
§ 170(f)(8) and providing transitional relief from "contemporaneous written ac-
knowledgment" of contribution).
"9 See March, 1994 Hearings, supra note 62, at 8 (finding that documented
cases of noncompliance by public charities demonstrated need for public scrutiny to
minimize misconduct). The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, heavily
regulated conduct of private foundations. The Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Leslie Samuels did not favor extending these regulations to include public charities
because the administrative burden might hinder them in their performance of chari-
table functions.
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tiation and disclosure arose from congressional concern about
quid pro quo matters and charitable contributions.' 0 In 1987
and 1988, when Congress was examining laws relating to lobby-
ing and political activities, it also found that the rules governing
charitable contributions, charitable solicitations and charitable
deductions relating to quid pro quo matters resulted in uncer-
tainty and, in some cases, abuse.''
In 1987, Congress expressed concern that charitable organi-
120 For example, the growing use of scrip for fund-raising purposes has led to
the abuse of the system. Scrip, or grocery coupons, is a trend made popular in recent
years by California and other grocers. Its use has grown to encompass hundreds of
businesses, schools, religious organizations and nonprofit institutions. The I.R.S.
claims that some individuals are violating the law by claiming that scrip payments
are deductible contributions. See Galvin Power, Catholic Diocese the Biggest Player,
Fund-Raisers' Dream Tool - Scrip, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 9, 1995 at Al.
Non-profit organizations would raise money by purchasing scrip certificates from
businesses below face value and then reselling the same certificates at face value to
members. Id. To be sure, the IRS San Francisco office put out a major alert advising
purchasers that scrip is not a charitable contribution because purchasers receive
something in return for use of the coupon. Other questionable charitable contribu-
tions are those which involve solicitations that do not indicate the fair market value
of the benefit conferred. A $150 ticket to a dinner may state: "Contributions de-
ductible to the extent provided by law." A television ad may promise "If you make
your tax-deductible pledge today in the amount of $100, you will receive a leather-
bound gilt-edged volume of the Internal Revenue Code. For $50 more, you will get a
matching set of the Federal Tax Regulations." These are but a few examples of
questionable charitable solicitations that may not be deductible at all. Rev. Rule. 67-
246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 includes examples of charitable solicitations involving quid pro
quo, that are non-deductible in whole or in part. In general, if the soliciting organi-
zation does not indicate the fair market value of the benefit conferred, the entire
contribution is not deductible. Id.
12 H.R. REP. No. 391(II), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378 (discussing, for example, membership solicitations which
implied that entire contribution was tax deductible although contributor received
benefit); 134 CONG. REC. H276 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pickle)
(discussing disclosure requirements for non-charitable tax-exempt organizations);
133 CONG. REC. H6362 (daily ed. July 15, 1987) (statement of Rep. Pickle)
(discussing lack of compliance by exempt organizations regarding public disclosure
of lobbying and political activity); I.R.S. News Release IR-88-31 (Feb. 10, 1988)
(covering disclosure requirements of non-charitable tax-exempt organizations); see
also I.R.C. § 6115 (Supp. V 1993) (addressing disclosure for quid pro quo contribu-
tions to charitable organizations), Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-26 I.R.B. 18 (extending
Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471); Rev Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471 (providing
guidelines on deductibility when contributors receive something in exchange for
contribution); Rev. Proc. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88 (regulating payments to athletic
scholarships when they confer right to purchase preferred seating at games); Rev.
Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (regulating charitable contributions where benefit is
conferred).
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zations did not accurately inform their patrons of the extent to
which contributions were deductible. 2 ' In an attempt to remedy
this situation, in 1988 the Internal Revenue Service sent to over
400,000 charitable organizations copies of Publication 1391, De-
ductibility of Payments Made to Charities Conducting Fund-
Raising Events, which requested that charities be more forth-
right and informative toward patrons about the deductibility of
contributions. Contained within the publication was a copy of
Revenue Ruling 67-246, which provided a procedure for charities
to utilize in accomplishing this purpose."2 3 Congress, however,
was still concerned that questionable charitable fundraising ex-
isted.2 4 The provision, enacted as section 170(f)(8) of the Code,'25
is anticipated to yield additional tax revenues over five years of
$469,000,000 through a single information and disclosure report-
ing mechanism. 2 "
H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1608 (1987). In expressing their con-
cern, Congress stated that it anticipated that the Internal Revenue Service will
monitor the extent to which taxpayers are being furnished accurate and sufficient
information by charitable organizations as to the nondeductibility of payments to
such organizations where benefits or privileges are received in return, so that tax-
payers can accurately compute their Federal income tax liability. Id.
See Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1, C.B. 471. The articulated purpose of Rev. Proc.
90-12 is "to provide charitable organizations with help in advising their patrons of
the deductible amount of contributions under section 170 of the Code where the con-
tributors are receiving something in return for their contributions. These guidelines
will also be used by agents in determining whether charities have provided accurate
information about deductibility to their contributors." Id. See generally INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, MANUAL SUPPLEMENT MS 7(10)G-59 (REV. 1), PART VII -
EMPLOYEE PLANS AND EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS
COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT STUDY (1991) (providing instruction to I.R.S. about
study concerning fund raising and charitable solicitations); Chih-Chin Ho, Form
990-T Compliance, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESEARCH BULLETIN, Pub. No.
1500, 47 (1992).
'2' See, e.g., H.R. 613, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., (1995) (establishing national
clearinghouse for access to annual returns of exempt organizations); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC
GROWTH, NATURAL RESOURCES AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: ACTIVITIES
AND I.R.S. OVERSIGHT, GAO/T-GGD-95-198 (1995); March, 1994 Hearings, supra
note 62; Hearings on Review of Federal Tax Laws Applicable to Public Charities Be-
fore the Ways & Means Oversight Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1603 (1993);
June, 1993 Hearings, supra note 55.
m I.R.C. § 170(f(8) (Supp..V 1993).
126 See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (Supp. 1995); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. T.D. 8544, 59
Fed. Reg. 27458 (1994) (explaining § 170(f)(8) and soliciting public comment on
whether transitional relief is required for 1994 contributions).
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Substantiation rules focus on the deductibility of payments
by the donor."7 The general rule is that in order for a contribu-
tion to be deductible, donors must obtain a contemporaneous
written acknowledgement from the donor organization if the con-
tribution is $250 or more." 8 A canceled check is no longer suffi-
cient. 121 This acknowledgement must indicate the amount of
money that was received by the donor, a description of whatever
property was given, but not the value of such property, and a
statement of whether or not any services or goods were provided
in consideration for that payment, and if so, their value. 3 °
Although technically the donor is responsible for obtaining
such substantiation, 3 1 in practice, the burden falls on the chari-
table organization. If a charity fails to substantiate a contribu-
tion, such donor might be denied his/her deduction. Since this
result could discourage further contributions on the donor's part,
charities generally make every effort to ensure that the contri-
butions are properly documented.'32 If a charity wants the bene-
fit of a subsidy not only of exemption from income tax but also of
tax-deductible contributions it must be willing to comply with
'34the substantiation rules,'33 as well as the disclosure rules, un-
127 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A) (Supp. V 1993) ("no deduction shall be allowed ... for
any contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribu-
tion.) See H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 774, 784 (1993) (indicating that
payment to charity from which donor receives economic benefit is only deductible to
extent payment exceeds fair market value of benefit).
128 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
29 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B). An acknowledgement must include the amount of cash
and description of any property, other than cash, contributed; whether the organi-
zation provided any goods or services in return for the contribution; and a descrip-
tion and good faith estimate of the value of the goods or services provided by the
organization. Id. If the organization provided an "intangible religious benefit," de-
fined as an intangible benefit "provided by an organization organized exclusively for
religious purposes and which generally is not sold in a commercial transaction out-
side the donative context", the donee must furnish a statement indicating that such
a religious benefit was conferred. Id.
's See supra note 129.
131 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A); see also Robert E. Fitzgerald, Jr., Charitable Contribu-
tions-Canceled Checks to Substantiate the Contribution Under § 170 May No
Longer Be Sufficient, 50 J. MO. B. 171 (1994) (indicating that donor must request
substantiation from charity; charity is not responsible for reporting this information
to Internal Revenue Service for donor).
'3' See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures,
the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (1994).
131 Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 13172(a) provides that the substantiation rules of
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der the Internal Revenue Code.
Charitable organizations are also required to make a good
faith estimate of the value of any goods or services that are pro-
vided in connection with a quid quo pro contribution of more
than $75.135 For example, if a charitable organization charges
$150 for a dinner, and the meal, in good-faith, can be valued at
$50, then the charity is required to indicate that $100 is the total
charitable contribution.
136
However, an exception is made for intangible religious
benefits. 37 If such a benefit is part of the quid quo pro, a state-
ment to that effect is required, but the valuation of the benefit
conferred need not be included. 3 ' The Code defines an intangible
religious benefit as any intangible benefit that is provided by an
organization solely for religious purposes'39 and that generally is
I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) apply to contributions made on or after January 1, 1994. See also
Carolyn C. Clark, The Brave New World of Charitable Giving and Fund-Raising,
C968 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 249, 255 (1994) (stating that substantiation rules are intended to
prevent taxpayers from exaggerating income tax charitable deductions).
... Section 13173(d) of Pub. L. No. 103-66 provides that I.R.C. § 6115 applies to
quid pro quo contributions made on or after January 1, 1994. See also Clark, supra
note 133, at 256 (stating that § 6115 places legal disclosure obligation on charitable
organization).
"' I.R.C. § 6115(b) (stating that quid pro quo contributions, payments made
partly as contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services provided to
payor by donee organization of $75 or more, are subject to rule).
136 See Clark, supra note 133, at 266-67 (providing an example where if Z, a
public TV channel, provides contributors with autographed baseball with fair mar-
ket value of $200 in return for "contribution" of $250. Z must provide statement in-
forming donors that only $50 is deductible for income tax purposes pursuant to §
6115); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 131 at 172-73. Fitzgerald agrees that it is the
responsibility of the charity to furnish the donor with a written statement of the
value of goods or services received, and to inform the donor that any deduction is
limited to the amount of payment that exceed the value of goods and services pro-
vided).
37 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8B)(iii). I.R.C. § 6115(b) states that "quid pro quo contribu-
tion does not include any payment made to an organization, organized exclusively
for religious purposes, in return for which the taxpayer receives solely an intangible
religious benefit that generally is not sold in a commercial transaction outside the
donative context." See e.g., Pamela F. Olson, The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993:
Provisions Applicable to Individuals, Excise Taxes, and Compliance, Q225 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 47, 61 (1993) (stating that quid pro quo contributions do not include
"intangible religious benefits").
'3 I.R.C. § 6115(b); see also Clark, supra note 133, at 258 (stating that if goods
and services provided consist only of "intangible religious benefit," no valuation is
required; mere acknowledgment of this fact is sufficient).
"9 "Solely for religious purposes" refers to organizations performing tasks for
which a group exemption letter can be obtained. See Meade Emory & Lawrence Ze-
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not sold in a commercial transaction outside the donative con-
text.40 Admission to a religious ceremony and wine served as
part of the ceremony, are examples of intangible religious bene-
fits. 141
Religious organizations will no doubt feel the impact of the
new substantiation and disclosure requirements. Similarly, pro-
posals for intermediate sanctions will affect religious organiza-
tions.4 2 The statutory change for intermediate sanctions enjoys
bi-partisan support, and a version of the Treasury proposals was
passed by the House of Representatives on April 16, 1996, with
Senate action possibly to come this Congressional Session. The
Treasury proposed regulations on the substantiation and disclo-
sure rules on August 4, 1995, and expects that final regulations
will be issued before the end of 1996. Religious organizations
need to continue to follow these important changes.
lenak, The Tax Exempt Status of Communitarian Religious Organizations: An Un-
necessary Controversy, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1982) (discussing definition and
application of "solely for religious purposes").
"0 I.R.C. § 6115(b).
141 See Clark, supra note 133, at 258 (providing examples of intangible religious
benefits); Olson, supra note 137, at 53 (listing admission to religious ceremony as
example of"intangible religious benefit").
See 103 Cong. Rec. E3057-01, E3057-58 (1993) (discussing how sanctions are
modeled on private foundations and how they will affect religious organizations).
